Michele L. Swers notes that, at the individual level, members utilize cosponsorship both to clarify their position on issues and to take positions for electoral constituencies. As a mechanism for expressing policy preferences, cosponsorship allows members to support bills that more accurately reflect their true policy preferences, in contrast to the circumscribed choices that are offered in a floor vote. By taking advantage of opportunities to cosponsor, the legislator can build a record on issues of personal concern. With regard to position taking, a member can utilize cosponsorship to take positions that satisfy key groups of voters, important interest groups, and potential campaign donors.
As a mechanism for coalition building, the number and identity of cosponsors serves as an important signal to party and committee leaders concerning the nature and depth of support for a piece of legislation. For example, Wilson and Young (1997) find that the number of cosponsors influences whether or not a bill receives committee consideration. It has no impact, however, on the probability that a bill will advance to the floor. Kessler and Krehbiel (1996) highlight the importance of the ideological distribution of the cosponsors as a signal of which policies will be favored by a congressional majority. Koger (2003) notes that bill sponsors pursue particular legislators, such as members of the committee of jurisdiction, committee leaders, or members of a state delegation, for proposals of cosponsors in order to affect a specific state delegation and to bolster the legitimacy of a bill in the eyes of the agenda setters, the party and committee leaders who decide whether a bill is given consideration in committee and on the floor. Because of the voluntary nature of cosponsorship as a mechanism for expressing policy preferences and its importance as a mechanism for coalition building, if congresswomen are more likely to cosponsor legislation that reflects the underpinnings of the gender gap than are their male colleagues, then this fact provides support for the idea that increasing the descriptive representation of women in Congress enhances the substantive representation of women in the mass public.
Much of the current research on cosponsorship has ignored the impact of social identity on the decision to cosponsor bills in specific policy areas. This disregard stems from a larger consensus in congressional research that legislative behavior is best predicted by constituency influence, party affiliation, and institutional position. Yet rationalchoice models do allow for the possibility that the same district can support different reelection constituencies (Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1974) , thus allowing for the possibility that women candidates might be more likely to attract female voters or those concerned with social welfare issues as key groups of supporters (Carroll 2002; Reingold 2000) . Among 410 those who have studied the impact of social identity on cosponsorship of specific legislation, Canon (1999) found that African American representatives were much more likely to cosponsor legislation with racial content than were white representatives with large minority populations in their districts. In their study of managed-care bills, Balla and Nemacheck (2000) found that women were more likely to cosponsor bills targeted at women's health concerns, but the sex of the legislator had no impact on the decision to cosponsor comprehensive reform bills. Similarly, Wolbrecht (2000 Wolbrecht ( , 2002 Swers 1998, and Welch 1985) . Therefore, the majority of systematic longitudinal evidence concerning gender differences in policy priorities comes from studies of state legislatures. Researchers have found that female legislators sponsor more bills concerning issues such as health care, education, children and families, and women's rights than do their male colleagues. Women are more likely to consider these bills a priority, and they are more successful in achieving passage of these initiatives into law (Dodson and Carroll 1991; Saint-Germain 1989; Thomas 1994) .
One significant drawback to some of the state research is that the focus on evaluating aggregate gender differences across time and different states prevents them from adequately addressing how political context and institutional dynamics affect legislative behavior. In these studies, gender differences in legislative activity are explained by the presence or absence of a women's caucus or by the proportion of women in the legislature reaching a "critical mass" (see, for example, Dodson and Carroll 1991, Saint-Germain 1989, and Thomas 1994).2 These studies do not address the possibility that differences attributed to gender are better explained by the fact that more women in the legislatures are Democrats or, alternatively, that more women may be clustered on the social welfare committees that have jurisdiction over many of the issues where gender differences are found. Additionally, these state-level studies do not address how changes in the institutional and political contexts, such as a shift from majority to minority party By examining the impact of women in the presence of major partisan, constituency, and institutional factors known to influence legislative behavior, my research can more accurately assess the extent to which gender contributes to the decision to support bills in specific policy areas. The comparison of legislative behavior in the 103d and 104th Congresses allows me to assess the stability of women's commitment to gender gap issues and to illuminate how their legislative choices are shaped by changes in the political context. Finally, by focusing on the impact of institutional position, particularly majority party status and committee position, I demonstrate that in certain cases, when women achieve positions of strategic advantage (such as majority party status or a seat on a relevant committee), they increase their cosponsorship activity at higher rates than do similarly situated male colleagues.
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Cosponsorship Activity
Data and Methodology
To determine whether or not the policy preferences of female elites in Congress reflect the expectations of voters and the gender differences in opinion surveys of the mass public, I examined members' cosponsorship activity during the 103d and 104th Congresses in five issue areas commonly identified as important sources of gender differences: education, children-and-family issues outside of education, women's health, general health care, and welfare. I analyzed the impact of gender on the number of bills a legislator cosponsored in each of these issue areas after accounting for major partisan, constituency, and institutional factors known to influence legislative decision making.
To identify a sample of bills in each of these issue areas that could be easily duplicated by other scholars, I consulted the monthly legislative reports and publications of five liberal and conservative women's groups. Each group claims to represent women's interests and regularly follows issues of concern to women as they proceed through Congress. The groups include the American Association of University Women (liberal), the National Organization for Women Secondary Education Act, Head Start, and the Women's Educational Equity Act); job training programs; education for the disabled; the creation of the National Service program; school vouchers; and education savings accounts.5 Some bills are included in more than one policy category. For example, bills dealing with children's health are included in both the children and family (non-education) sample and the general health sample. Table 2 displays the same descriptive statistics for the individual bills within each issue category. Clearly, individual bills vary greatly in the number of cosponsors they attract, ranging from zero to almost an entire party delegation when an issue is salient to the public and constitutes a battleground between the two parties. For example, in the 103d Congress, the Clinton Health Plan and the Republican alternative attracted 103 Democratic and 141 Republican cosponsors, respectively, and in the 104th Congress, the Republican Welfare Reform Bill had 120 cosponsors.
To evaluate the importance of gender as an independent influence on members' policy preferences, I created dependent variables that measure the number of bills cosponsored by each member for the five policy areas. Since the majority of research on legislative decision making does not include a role for social identity, it is possible that differences Tables 3 and 4 ). These models are more suitable than ordinary least squares regression when the dependent variable is a count of events-in this case, a count of the number of bills cosponsored in specific policy areas. The Poisson regression model is the most common event-count model. This model assumes that the probability of an event occurring at any given time is constant within a specified period and independent of all previous events (G. King 1989). It is likely, however, that members who cosponsor one bill concerning education or children's issues will be more inclined to cosponsor another bill on the subject, thus violating the assumption of independence. The negative binomial accounts for this dependence through a dispersion parameter. A dispersion parameter of 0 indicates an absence of dispersion and an independence of events; a dispersion parameter greater than 0 indicates overdispersion (Balla and Nemacheck 2000; G. King 1989). I first estimated Poisson models for each of the dependent variables. In six of the ten policy area models, chi-squared tests indicated that the dependent variables were not Poisson distributed and so I employed a negative binomial model.
The independent variables used in the regression analyses in Tables  3 and 4 were drawn from the vast congressional research concerning the elements that motivate legislators' policy decisions. Since party affiliation is one of the most reliable guides to how members of Congress approach issues (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991), I created variables for Republican men and women and Democratic men and women. Dividing men and women by party allows me to assess the possibility that differences attributed to gender are better explained by the fact that more women in Congress are Democrats and Democrats are viewed as more active on social welfare issues. Because I expect that Democrats are more supportive of these proposals, the models in Tables 3 and 4 . These scores range from -1, indicating "most liberal," to +1, indicating "most conservative." Although party and ideology are highly correlated, these scores allow me to capture intraparty differences in interest in social welfare policy issues. I hypothesized that liberal Democrats would be more active on these issues than conservative Democrats and moderate Republicans would be more active than conservative Republicans.8
The needs of the district rank foremost in the minds of all representatives (Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974) . I accounted for the nature of the legislator's constituency by including census data measuring the percentage of the district that was urban, the district's median household income, the elderly population in the district, the African-American population in the district, and whether or not the district was in a Southern state.9 I used the proportion of the district that voted for Clinton in 1992 to assess the level of Democratic support in the district.
Finally, a legislator's position within the institution will affect the utility of cosponsorship as a means of communicating his or her positions to constituents and achieving policy goals. I included a variable indicating whether or not the representative was a first-term legislator because I believe that such members' inexperience with developing legislation and their lack of access to important committee posts and leadership positions will make cosponsorship an important tool for communicating their policy priorities. Numerous scholars discuss the importance of a member's committee seat as a guide to that member's policy activity (Hall 1996 While I expected committee members and first-term legislators to be more active cosponsors than the average member, I expected the leaders of these committees, particularly the committee and subcommittee chairs, to be less active cosponsors because they can draw on more resources, such as their access to more staff and their control of the committee markup process, to achieve their policy goals. To test this hypothesis, I included variables for the chairs and ranking minority members of the committees and subcommittees that constitute the committee variables for each policy area. Similarly, I included a separate variable for members of the Appropriations Committee's Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education because I believe that the high levels of influence that these members wield over the distribution of funding for social welfare programs will make cosponsorship a less necessary tool for the achievement of their policy goals.11 Finally, I used a variable measuring the total number of bills cosponsored by each member to account for the fact that those members who cosponsor more bills are mathematically more likely to cosponsor a bill in one of the policy areas in this study.
Analysis and Discussion
The regression results in Tables 3 and 4 indicate that, in addition to ideology and committee position, being a female representative is one of the most consistent predictors of interest in education, childrenand-family issues, women's health, and general health issues. Being a woman has no impact, however, on the decision to cosponsor welfare bills. To gain insight into how much support for legislative action on these issues would be increased if more women were elected to Congress, I calculated predicted probabilities that compare the number of bills that liberal and conservative, Republican and Democratic men and women would cosponsor.12
The differences are not always large, ranging from no difference in the education cosponsorship patterns of Republicans in the 104th Congress to a difference of 5.3 more women's health bills cosponsored by liberal Democratic women in comparison with liberal Democratic men in the 103d Congress. Nevertheless, the results in Table 5 reveal some interesting patterns in the policy interests of men and women and the ways they use their institutional positions to advance their policy goals.
With regard to policy issues, the largest differences between men and women are found on the women's health issues. Liberal Democratic women take the lead in promoting these issues in both the 103d and 104th Congresses. Liberal Democratic women were predicted to cosponsor 10.6 women's health bills in the 103d Congress, 5.3 more bills than their liberal male colleagues. In the 104th Congress, these women were predicted to cosponsor 9.5 women's health bills, 4.1 more bills than liberal Democratic men. Similarly, in the 103d Congress, moderate Republican women were predicted to cosponsor 3.3 more women's health bills than their moderate male colleagues. In the 104th Congress, they would cosponsor 2.4 more women's health bills than moderate Republican men. Additionally, these moderate Republican women were predicted to cosponsor about as many women's health bills as liberal Democratic men in the 103d Congress and more women's health bills than conservative Democratic men in both Congresses.
The heightened interest of female legislators in women's health issues across party and the ideological spectrum is consistent with theories about the connection between descriptive and substantive representation of women. Women's health issues are relatively new to the congressional agenda and have not been fully incorporated into committee jurisdictions. Therefore, identity will play a heightened role in determining which members act as legislative entrepreneurs on these issues. Additionally, among the policy issues examined, these issues have the most direct consequences for women as a group. Women of all ideological predispositions may believe that by advocating these issues they are representing the interests of women as a district and a national constituency.
As expected, the coefficients for the DW-NOMINATE scores indicate that, with the exception of education issues in the Republicancontrolled 104th Congress, liberals are the most active cosponsors of social welfare legislation13 (see Tables 3 and 4 ). The predicted probabilities in Table 5 indicate that liberal Democratic women often take the lead in cosponsoring the most bills in the education, children-andfamily, women's health, and general health policy areas. In comparison to conservative Democratic men, moderate Republican women are consistently more active cosponsors of social welfare issues across both Congresses, indicating that for moderate Republicans the sex of the legislator is a very important influence on the decision to focus on social welfare issues, contradicting the normal partisan and ideological trends in the development of policy priorities in these areas.
Beyond ideology, the probabilities demonstrate that women's activism on these policy issues varies with their level of institutional influence, particularly their status as members of the majority or minority party. When members are in the majority, they wield agenda power, which provides increased opportunities to see favored policy initiatives enacted into law. Therefore, when members are in the majority, they should increase their activism on issues of personal concern. Although the evidence is not definitive, differences in the cosponsorship patterns of women as majority and minority party members suggest that women often increase their cosponsorship activity at higher rates when they have access to the prerogatives of majority power. As shown in Table 5 , in the Democratic-controlled 103d Congress, liberal Democratic women were predicted to cosponsor the most bills in the four policy areas in which sex exerts an important influence on cosponsorship. When Democratic women were relegated to the minority party, they only took the lead in cosponsorship of women's health issues and they cosponsored about the same number of general health bills as Republican women. They also cosponsored fewer children-and-family bills than Republican women and fewer education bills than all Republicans in the 104th Congress. Furthermore, the differences in the cosponsorship activity among male and female liberal Democrats were generally larger when these Democratic women served in the majority. For example, when liberal Democratic women were in the majority party, these women were predicted to cosponsor 1.9 more childrenand-family bills and 5.3 more women's health bills than were liberal Democratic men. As minority party members, these differences were reduced: Democratic women were predicted to cosponsor 1.4 more children-and-family bills than were Democratic men, and liberal Democratic women were predicted to cosponsor 4.1 more women's health bills than were liberal men.
In the Republican-controlled 104th Congress, moderate Republican women used their majority status to pursue legislation regarding children, family, and general health care. As minority party members in the 103d Congress, moderate and conservative Republican women were predicted to cosponsor fewer children-and-family bills than liberal and conservative Democratic women and liberal Democratic men. As majority party members, however, Republican women were predicted to cosponsor the most children-and-family legislation. Additionally, following the failure of the Clinton health-care reform bills, as Republicans debated proposals to reform Medicare and Medicaid and guarantee the portability of health insurance, majority party Republican women became even more active cosponsors of legislation concerning general health issues than did their male counterparts. The difference in the number of general health bills that Republican men and women were predicted to cosponsor in the 103d and 104th Congresses expanded from 0.4 to 3.0 bills for moderate Republicans and from 0.3 to 2.1 bills among conservative Republicans.
The patterns of increased activity on women's issues when female members achieve majority status are supported by evidence from 425 interviews with members and staff. Previously (Swers 2002), I found that when Republicans became the majority in 1994, Republican moderates, particularly women, became targets of aggressive lobbying from liberal interest groups who viewed them as their last hope against an unfriendly Republican majority. These moderate members did not want to be perceived by leadership or by the Republican caucus as carriers for liberal groups. Therefore, they had to carefully navigate the pressures from these competing forces as they made decisions concerning how to achieve their legislative objectives and preserve their political capital.
The regression models also highlight the importance of other aspects of a member's position within the institution, aside from majority party status. Although the coefficient only reaches significance in the models for education issues in the 104th Congress, children-and-family issues in the 103d Congress, and welfare issues in the 103d Congress, status as a first-term representative is generally a positive predictor of cosponsorship behavior. Since first-term members generally lack access to powerful committee seats and their staff is often inexperienced in drafting legislative proposals, cosponsorship provides these members with a valuable opportunity to advertise their policy positions to constituents, important interest groups, and fellow legislators.
As other researchers have found, where one sits in the institution is an important predictor of where one stands on the issues. In almost every case, having a seat on one of the committees or subcommittees that considered the most legislation in a policy category was a positive predictor of which members would cosponsor bills in that issue area. This finding supports the idea that committee members serve as information specializers conveying expertise on the policy consequences of legislation to fellow members (Krehbiel 1991) . Thus, the utility of cosponsorship as a legislative signal may be as important as its utility as a method of advertising positions to constituents.
Although cosponsorship has clear benefits for first-term members, the models indicate that it is not an important legislative tool for committee leaders or members of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, which controls the funding for the majority of social welfare programs. The coefficients for these variables are insignificant in almost all cases, indicating that the resources these members control, such as the scheduling of hearings and markups and the funding of specific programs, make cosponsoring bills a less necessary tool for achieving their policy goals. Conversely, ranking members, as leaders of the minority delegation, have less influence over the committee agenda. Therefore, cosponsorship holds more value for minority leaders as a method of signaling their opposition and their true policy preferences. Thus, being a ranking member has a positive and significant influence on cosponsorship of education legislation in the 103d and 104th Congresses and of children-and-family issues in the 103d Congress. The relationship between members' committee positions and their cosponsorship agendas suggests that the inclusion of more women on relevant committees could expand the openness of the congressional agenda to proposals concerning various social welfare issues.
Conclusion
By evaluating the impact of social identity on policy preferences in the presence of important ideological, constituency, and institutional factors known to influence legislative behavior, this study indicates that there is a clear connection between descriptive representation and substantive representation. The policy activity of female elites in Congress does reflect the gender differences found in opinion surveys in the mass public and in studies of voter expectations about male and female candidates. While the differences are not always great, female legislators are more likely than their male colleagues to cosponsor legislation in four of the five issue areas examined, including education, children-and-family, women's health, and general health issues. Sex differences in advocacy of policies in these areas are generally greatest among liberal Democrats, a group that one would expect to be the most active advocates of social welfare initiatives. Yet I found consistent differences in commitment to these policies among male and female legislators across the ideological spectrum. Additionally, moderate Republican women are consistently more active cosponsors of social welfare bills than are conservative Democratic men.
The careful attention devoted to the impact of changes in the institutional and political context demonstrates that members' decisions concerning which policies to advocate and what strategies to employ to achieve policy goals are mediated by their positions within the institution. Cosponsorship serves as an important tool for first-term members to convey their policy preferences on social welfare issues to constituents, legislators, and other interested groups, but committee leaders and members of the Appropriations Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education can draw on more-effective mechanisms to achieve their policy goals.
The close examination of the importance of institutional position also indicates that when women gain access to strategic positions of Table 5 reflect the mean number of bills that a given representative would cosponsor in each policy area.
13. The gender-party variables indicate that Republican men were the most active cosponsors of welfare bills in the 103d Congress.
